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Forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) is an emerging technology that seeks to
make probabilistic inferences regarding a person’s observable characteristics
(“phenotype”) from DNA. The aim is to aid criminal investigations by
helping to identify unknown suspected perpetrators, or to help with non-
criminal missing persons cases. Here we provide results from the analysis of
36 interviews with those who have a professional stake in FDP, including
forensic scientists, police ofﬁcers, lawyers, government agencies and social
scientists. Located in eight EU countries, these individuals were asked for
their views on the beneﬁts and problems associated with the prospective use
of FDP. While all interviewees distinguished between those phenotypic tests
perceived to either raise ethical, social or political concerns from those tests
viewed as less ethically and socially problematic, there was wide variation
regarding the criteria they used to make this distinction. We discuss the
implications of this in terms of responsible technology development.
Keywords: Forensic DNA phenotyping; ethics; forensics; genetic testing;
European Union (EU); ancestry testing; regulation
Introduction
Forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) is an emerging technology seeking to make
probabilistic inferences about an individual’s “phenotype” (their observable
characteristics) from their anonymous DNA sample. The aim is to aid criminal
investigations by helping identify unknown perpetrators on the basis of the analysis
of DNA from crime scene traces presumed to be deposited by the perpetrator, and
to help with open missing persons cases by analysing the DNA of unidentiﬁed
human remains for identiﬁcation purposes.
Genetic data from FDP tests cannot “predict” the external characteristics of a
person with certainty. It can, however, be used to infer an individual’s phenotypic
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characteristics within a certain degree of probabilistic likelihood. Phenotypic traits
are multifactorial, meaning that they are not determined by one gene but by a
complex interplay between many genetic markers as well as the environment. At
present, some traits such as appearance (also referred to as externally visible
characteristics [EVCs], for example, hair, skin and eye color), biological age (as
predicted by epigenetic testing1) and bio-geographical ancestry (the estimation of
the geographical origin of a person’s genetic ancestors at the continental level –
herein referred to as ancestry) can be inferred, in certain circumstances, with
high enough probabilities to make them useful in the criminal justice system
(Kayser 2015).
Across the EU, FDP is currently only explicitly regulated in the Netherlands and
Slovakia. In the Netherlands, testing for sex, biogeographical ancestry (“race”) and
hair and eye color is permitted and practiced; in Slovakia, testing for “visible phe-
notypic traits” is allowed (Samuel and Prainsack 2018). In all other EU countries,
regulatory frameworks for, and practices relating to, FDP are complicated by either
implicit or absent legislation. An important reason for this is that most EU countries
regulated forensic DNA technologies in the 1990s, when FDP was not yet known.2
In brief, in some countries where explicit regulation is lacking, experts and prac-
titioners interpret this as permission to practice FDP in the criminal justice
system, and FDP is practiced in these countries to varying degrees (e.g. Spain,
UK). In other countries, current legislation is interpreted by experts as implicitly
forbidding FDP (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Austria). On-going policy discussions
regarding the regulation of FDP are currently underway in Germany and
Switzerland.3
FDP poses a range of social and ethical issues. We note three concerns here that
are most prominently discussed in the literature. First, given that FDP tests are
probabilistic, concerns have been raised about the nature of information FDP can
provide, and the possibility of the predictive nature of the information being mis-
understood (Cino 2017; Enserink 2011; Sankar 2012; Seo et al. 2017; Toom et al.
2016). These concerns are compounded by expectation-generating for-proﬁt com-
panies such as Parabon Nanolabs, which markets FDP as a technology capable of
creating composite faces of individuals from a sample of DNA alone; often based
on tests which are under developed, scientiﬁcally not documented, and un-vali-
dated (Gannon 2017; Wienroth 2018). Tests offered by these companies are
already used by some EU law enforcement agencies to aid criminal investigation
(personal communication). Second, a number of scholars are particularly con-
cerned that the use of FDP may exacerbate stigmatization or discrimination
already directed at minority groups within society (Koops and Schellekens
2008), particularly with relation to biogeographical ancestry inferences. Here,
whilst many FDP scientists stress that biogeographical ancestry is not the same
as race, and pertains to ancestral continental geographical origin rather than the
speciﬁc physical appearance of individuals (Kayser and Schneider 2012, e18),
others scholars emphasize that a test result stating a person “is likely of African
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origin” may be translated by non-specialists into the social language of identity or
race, such as “African American” or “black”. In this way, ancestry information
pulled from a DNA proﬁle might lead to law enforcement making decisions
based on predisposed expectations about the link between ancestry and racial/
social identity (Lipphardt et al. 2017; Matheson 2016; M’charek 2013; Ossorio
2006; Sankar 2012). Finally, concerns have been raised that FDP may infringe
privacy protections in certain instances. This could occur in a number of situations.
First, in instances in which an individual has chosen to change her “natural” appear-
ance, such as via instances of hair dying, plastic surgery and/or the use of contact
lenses (Ossorio 2006). Second, if a test suggests an individual has a speciﬁc ances-
try, and this does not match their appearance or narrative identity. Finally, if a test
provides information that can also be correlated with a medical condition (for
example the link between red hair and increased risk of melanomas) (Haga
2006). In each of these instances, these people’s privacy may be infringed if
police counter the appearance or narrative of the person with genetic information
that tells another story.
Given such concerns, there have been appeals for the development, implemen-
tation and governance of FDP to be approached in an ethically and socially respon-
sible fashion (Murphy 2013) – much like the broader calls for responsible research
and innovation more generally (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013). The aim of
this paper is to contribute to this debate by providing empirical data about how
people with professional stakes in phenotypic testing perceive the ethical, social
and regulatory issues related to this ﬁeld. Our analysis focuses on phenotypic
testing for age, appearance and ancestry: our paper stems from VISAGE
(“Visible Attributes Through Genomics”) – a large EU-funded academic consor-
tium project which aims to develop, validate and implement a set of prototype
tools (the “VISAGE” toolkit) to allow for probabilistic inferences about age, ances-
try and appearance from DNA.4 We, the authors of the paper, form the work
package of VISAGE that explores the social, ethical, and regulatory aspects of
FDP, and is tasked with developing recommendations as to where and when
FDP for age, biogeographical ancestry and appearance could be implemented in
a socially, ethically and politically responsible manner in eight VISAGE rep-
resented EU member states, if at all. This paper contributes to this work.
We conducted 36 interviews in eight European countries5 with members of crim-
inal justice organizations, members of the police and representatives of government
agencies, as well as with scientists from STEM (science, technology, engineering,
and maths) subjects, social scientists, and academic lawyers who either worked in
the broader forensic genetic technologies arena or whose work touched speciﬁcally
on phenotypic DNA-based testing in the criminal justice context (in terms of
the scientiﬁc development, regulatory questions, etc.) Interviewees included
members of the VISAGE team.
As we conducted our interviews, it became clear that our respondents did not
view FDP as a technology with clear boundaries that “raised” ethical issues.
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Instead, FDP was portrayed as a heterogenous net of practices and material technol-
ogies that were partly shaped by ethical considerations. By this we mean that our
interviewees subsumed only those technologies and practices under the label of
FDP that did not, in their view, conﬂict with or detract from what they considered
responsible science and technology. Whilst the latter was a view that virtually all of
our interviewees articulated in one way or another, our respondents differed in
where they drew the boundary between what they considered ethically challenging
and what seemed unproblematic to them. These differences, by and large, were
unrelated to the interviewees’ professional identities, though we observed a trend
for police ofﬁcers being more inclusive regarding what they saw as ethically accep-
table than other professional groups.
Before we discuss these ﬁndings in greater detail, and explore how they can con-
tribute to discussions relating to the responsible regulation of FDP, we will clarify
how the relationship between “traditional” forensic DNA proﬁling and FDP is com-
monly described in the literature. We will also introduce the notion of ethical
boundary work, which has been helpful in conceptualizing our ﬁndings. The use
of ethical boundary work has previously been applied to other areas of forensic
DNA technology analysis to understand how forensic practitioners set certain
boundaries around their work (Machado and Granja 2018).6
Background
The novelty of FDP compared to traditional forensic DNA proﬁling
In the scientiﬁc literature, FDP is portrayed to sit in contrast to standard forensic
DNA proﬁling techniques. “Traditional” forensic DNA is commonly seen to aim
to identify an individual on the basis of DNA that says nothing about the personal
characteristics of that individual. It does this by analysing the proﬁle (pattern) of a
speciﬁc set of an individual’s “non-coding” genetic markers, typically so-called
short tandem repeats (STRs). STRs are markers located in a region of (non-
coding) DNAwhich is argued to provide no information about a person’s personal
traits. FDP, in contrast, aims to analyze a sample of an unknown individual’s
DNA to purposely ﬁnd out information about that person’s observable character-
istics. Genetic markers for FDP are therefore often located in the coding region of
DNA (i.e. in a region of DNA which “codes” for a protein, and which therefore
provides information about an observable characteristic). Moreover, the main
utility (actual or envisaged) of the two technologies lies elsewhere: whilst STR-
based proﬁling, besides its use in excluding or including suspects from or in an
investigation, can be used as evidence in the courtroom in an attempt to
convict a suspected perpetrator, FDP’s intended use is to help ﬁnd an unknown
suspect during police investigations. Once a suspect is found with the help of
FDP, it is envisaged that a “traditional” STR-based proﬁle derived from this
suspect would be compared with a crime scene proﬁle and thus enable investi-
gators to ascertain whether the two proﬁles match. FDP is also viewed as
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potentially useful to help identify unidentiﬁed human remains in missing persons
cases (Kayser 2015).
Changing ethical boundaries in forensic DNA technologies
The regulation of forensic DNA technologies in the criminal justice system has his-
torically relied on the idea that DNA can be divided into coding and non-coding
regions, and on the assumption that because only the sections of DNA within the
coding region can provide information about an individual’s observable character-
istics (with the non-coding region considered as “junk” DNA), it is less ethically
problematic to conduct forensic DNA testing/proﬁling using non-coding genetic
markers (Benecke 2002; Kayser and de Knijff 2011). Despite the many issues
associated with the coding/non-coding distinction, it has served a useful ethical
boundary for regulators and practitioners between what is considered ethically
acceptable and not acceptable for forensic DNA testing and, in some jurisdictions,
is even written into forensic DNA legislation (Samuel and Prainsack 2018).7
The coding/non-coding ethical boundary is redundant for FDP, which uses
genetic markers typically located in the coding region. As regulators and prac-
titioners in the criminal justice system try and identify new ethical boundaries
for FDP, they also need to justify why analysing coding regions of DNA for foren-
sic purposes, which has historically been viewed as ethically problematic, is now
acceptable (see Addison 2017 for an analogous situation in a different ﬁeld).
Such discussions are already emerging in the literature. Here, some scholars state
that FDP testing should only be allowed for those tests where there is a very
high degree of probability with which the phenotypic trait can be predicted, and
conclusive meaningful results drawn, meaning that associations between genetic
markers and predicted traits would need to be strong, and markers would need to
have been validated (Murphy 2013; Smith and Urbas 2012). These same scholars,
alongside others, have suggested that visible traits that are apparent to the naked
eye are less “sensitive” to test for so that the visibility criterion could also be
used as an “ethical boundary” (Murphy 2013; Smith and Urbas 2012). Seo et al.
(2017) states, for example, that FDP should be used “only for predicting features
that are as perceptible as to human eyewitnesses by using only the markers that
are completely free of any ethical disputes” (Seo et al. 2017, 29). Similarly,
Kayser and colleagues refer to FDP as a “biological eye witness” (Kayser 2015).
Proponents of this view have argued that this demarcation would bypass most,
though not all, privacy issues. Even if we accepted that FDP should be considered
equivalent to an eyewitness statement, however, this would not make FDP ethically
unproblematic, because eyewitness evidence is never an isolated statement about
an objective fact but has its own associated ethical issues (Toom et al. 2016).
Human perception is inevitably shaped by people’s previous experiences, moral,
social and political reference points, and other conscious or unconscious biases.
An eyewitness’ memory of a light-skinned person is not an objective statement
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on skin tone on a standardized scale, but a statement of where the skin tone of the
other person stands in relation to the eyewitness’s own perception (which is in turn
dependent on her personal situation including her human environment). For an eye-
witness who grew up in Sub-Saharan Africa, light-skinnedness is likely to have a
different meaning and a different form than if the eyewitness who grew up in North-
ern Europe. Similarly, while variations in the facial features of people might be per-
ceptible to some people, they are not perceptible to others. In sum, Seo et al. (2017)
solution that FDP should only be used to predict features that “are as perceptible as
to human eyewitnesses” is problematic in the sense that it is unclear against what
criteria such “perceptibility” should be assessed.
Ethical boundary work
The notion of drawing “ethical boundaries” is not limited to the realms of for-
ensic science. Expanding on Gieryn’s concept of boundary-work (Gieryn 1983),
“ethical boundary work” was ﬁrst articulated as a concept by Wainwright and
colleagues in their 2006 paper exploring biomedical scientists working in the
ethically controversial area of human embryonic stem cells (Wainwright et al.
2006). Since then it has been applied by many other scholars in their ethical
explorations of innovative biotechnologies (Ehrich, Williams, and Farsides
2008; Frith, Jacoby, and Gabbay 2011; Hobson-West 2012; Holmberg 2010;
Machado and Granja 2018; Stephens 2013). Wainwright and colleagues
observed scientists drawing boundaries between their ethically legitimate
research activity and other less ethically scientiﬁc activity (Wainwright et al.
2006). As such, the authors argued that “ethics has become another line of
demarcation” drawn by scientists around their scientiﬁc research (p745). The
authors argue that this process of social demarcation “simultaneously serves to
deﬁne and defend the work of scientists involved in ethically sensitive
science” (p745). In terms of the latter, by defending their work as ethically
uncontroversial, located in a “positive ethical space” (compared to less ethically
acceptable research), the authors argue that scientists can maintain the positive
image of science, which in turn, permits them to continue to conduct their scien-
tiﬁc research. These boundaries are thus socially constructed.
As we show below, our ﬁndings suggest that it was not just scientists who
drew ethical boundaries around FDP, but also non-scientist FDP experts.
Whilst little relationship emerged between interviewees’ professional identities
and their views on where ethical boundaries should be drawn, there was
limited evidence that professional context meant that at least some police ofﬁcers
have “wider” ethical boundaries around FDP than other experts. In the discus-
sion we note the implications of these ﬁndings in terms of responsible research
and technology development. We note here that whilst the ethical boundaries
drawn by our interviewees are socially constructed and contextualized, they
still have a role to play in terms of contributing to responsible research and
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technology development, since this should consider and weigh up all stake-
holders’ views – not independently – but with an understanding of their
social and professional context.
Methods
Recruitment
Members of the VISAGE consortium were invited, via email, to speak to us about
their views on the scientiﬁc, ethical, social and regulatory issues related to FDP.
Using a snowballing method, experts from within the criminal justice system,
science and academia from the UK, Austria, France, Germany, Poland, Spain,
Sweden and the Netherlands were also contacted via email requesting their partici-
pation. Our aim was to interview at least one scientist, one police representative and
one governmental agency representative from each of the countries represented. We
were unable to interview a police representative in Germany, Poland, Austria or
Spain (in Germany and Austria FDP police do not use FDP). Table 1 displays
the number of participants we interviewed from each profession. To protect partici-
pants’ privacy, we are unable to break numbers down further into the respective
countries.
Interviews
Thirty-two interviews were conducted in 2017 by ﬁrst author, GS, via face-to-face,
skype or telephone. Interviews were conducted in English, digitally-recorded and
lasted between 30 min and 1 h 20 min. Four interviewees requested that the inter-
view be conducted in written format due to language barriers. The interview sche-
dule included questions relating to interviewees’ deﬁnitions of FDP; their
knowledge and opinions about FDP regulation in their respective countries, includ-
ing perceptions about beneﬁts and drawbacks of different forms of regulation; and
interviewees’ concerns about the FDP technology, with particular focus on ethical
and societal issues. A thematic analysis of interview data was carried out using an
inductive methodology. Initially, both ﬁrst and second author read the transcripts
and developed broad categories from the data. These ﬁndings were discussed to
ensure similar ideas and categories of interest had been identiﬁed, which they
Table 1. Number of participants interviewed from different professions.
Profession Number of participants
STEM scientist (geneticist, statistician etc) 14
Social scientist 5
Government agency representative 8
Police representative 6
Academic lawyer 3
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had. The ﬁrst author, GS, then conducted detailed coding of the interviews line-by-
line using NVivo software to develop more intricate themes.
All interviewees were given pseudonyms so as to anonymize the transcripts. Due
to the small ﬁeld of FDP, and the need to protect conﬁdentiality, we do not provide
information about individual interviewees’ country of residence or their job
description. Where appropriate, in the body of the ﬁndings we have noted any rel-
evant aggregative information about themes discussed and their relationship to
speciﬁc job descriptions.
Findings
The heterogeneity of FDP
Our interviewees saw phenotypic testing as a heterogeneous cluster of practices and
technologies. They included a range of different tests under the label, as well as
various different research methods, and technologies at various stages of scientiﬁc
and technological development. Many of our STEM scientist interviewees in par-
ticular discussed how we are still in the early stages of the development of pheno-
typic testing (n = 10/14). One scientist explained that whilst those in the criminal
justice system may wish to use phenotypic testing to aid with identifying suspected
perpetrators of serious crimes, at present, the science is not yet reliable enough and
there is no one “toolbox of method” that can be applied and deﬁned as FDP:
People talk about phenotyping but… there is simply not the reliable technique cur-
rently. And most of the scientists think that techniques need to be developed
before they can be applied… so there is a state of uncertainty, I think, concerning
this methodology and I think that is true for other countries as well. I think there is
simply not a toolbox of method available that can be applied directly at this
moment with a very high conﬁdence (interviewee 6)
Another STEM scientist pointed to other issues with the technology, explaining
how the results of tests that use statistical methods to compare the DNA sample
with large DNA datasets will be dependent upon on whose DNA sequences are
contained in the reference databases. This is because datasets containing only
certain subsets of the population’s DNA can produce false or inconclusive
results – a well-established issue with genetic analysis for health-related purposes
(Aicardi et al. 2016; Nanda et al. 2005; Need and Goldstein 2009). This, the inter-
viewee explained, suggests that there is still much work to be done in terms of
creating and developing suitable datasets so that clear evidence on the predictive
power of FDP tests for speciﬁc traits can be obtained. Until this was achieved –
and this interviewee explained that it was still very much an ongoing process –
it would be difﬁcult to standardize testing, or to demarcate a ﬁeld that could reliably
be called “FDP”:
Although there are publications out there on the association between DNA and…
ancestry, and even a discussion that one can read on DNA and phenotypic
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information…we still need to do more research to better describe the systems… .For
[example]…when you read that one is able to determine or estimate the chronologi-
cal age [using epigenetic testing] with the certainty of plus or minus 3 to 4 to 5 years.
But that is not across the entire age scale and not in every different issue, we are
mostly talking about blood and nothing else… this is very similar for eye colour,
hair colour, skin colour and also for others… […]… [and if] police ofﬁcers, the
judges, the stakeholders in the law enforcement, and if they would ask us a question
as researchers we would all have different answers because this research is not ﬁn-
ished… (interviewee 27)
From heterogeneity towards the boundaries of validity and reliability
With FDP comprising a cluster of different tests for different traits, some using
DNAmarkers and others using epigenetic ones, for many interviewees (all intervie-
wees who explicitly discussed the issue, n = 18), the question of whether a predic-
tive test for a speciﬁc phenotypic trait had been scientiﬁcally validated was a key
factor for deciding whether that test should be considered under the label of FDP.
By including only those tests that were validated and reliable under the label of
FDP, our interviewees distanced FDP from tests in the wider ﬁeld of phenotypic
testing that they perceived as under-developed, not appropriately validated, and
producing unreliable results (e.g. such as creating a visual “phantom image” of
an unknown perpetrator as some commercial companies currently claim to be
able to do). In other words, the concept of FDP, in the view of our interviewees,
did not merely denote an attempt to infer observable traits from DNA, but it signi-
ﬁed the technical ability to do so at a certain level of validity and reliability. This is
exempliﬁed as interviewee 8 talks about the effect of private companies using un-
validated phenotypic tests, highlighting the important relationship between
reliability and validity, and the need for science to be viewed as a trustworthy
endeavor: “overseas companies offer already ‘complete solutions’ namely DNA-
based photoﬁt pictures to police…making our discipline, the forensic genetics,
untrustworthy at long sight. [This is] not good for science.”
External validity – i.e. the ability of the test to accurately “predict” observable
traits in a high proportion of cases in the real world rather than just the
laboratory – was also seen as a necessary characteristic of FDP. For example, in
the extract below, an interviewee distinguishes between a phenotypic predictive
test that works in a scientiﬁc institution and one that works in practice “on the
ground”. Here, the interviewee is referring to ﬁeldwork challenges such as DNA
degradation and/or only having small, impure or incomplete samples of DNA to
test. The interviewee notes that we cannot view research methods and tests
created in a scientiﬁc laboratory as a technology (i.e. FDP) until they are validated
and can function usefully in the criminal justice system in practice:
We need to do a lot more before we can use the technology, it’s not only a legal thing
it’s also a scientiﬁc thing where we have some information from universities [about]
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how things work. But that doesn’t mean they work at the same practice and when
working in certain environments. So what we have from the university research is
that there is certain chances of prediction but this is isolated from the surrounding
… . (interviewee 35)
Different conceptualisations of utility within the boundaries of validity and
reliability
Whilst most STEM scientists (n = 12/14) explicitly pointed towards the boundary
between scientiﬁcally reliable and validated tests deemed FDP on the one hand,
and undeveloped probabilistic predictive tests for phenotypic traits on the other,
among the police ofﬁcers that we interviewed (n = 4/6) the line was more blurry.
Whilst reliability and validity were important, they also considered it very valuable
to have tests for as many phenotypic traits as possible included under the umbrella
of FDP so that they could use them when trying to solve serious crimes, such as
rape, murder or armed robbery:
I would be very, very much interested… [to]… get more and more information from
that speciﬁc crime stain to make the group of persons I am looking for as small as
possible. So yes more I would like the age, I would like the skin colour, I would
like the height of a person [(this currently can not be reliably predicted)], I would
like the whole phenotype. (interviewee 11)
These ﬁndings suggest that for those who are the “front lines” of crime scene work
such as police ofﬁcers, and who may feel the pressure of having to solve a crime the
most, it might be tempting to utilize tests even if they have not yet been validated or
if they have low predictive value – just in case they could be helpful. These ﬁndings
indicate a third category next to reliability and validity, namely utility (see Wien-
roth 2018), had bearing on where and how our interviewees drew the line
around FDP. For most of the scientists in our sample, the utility of a phenotypic
test was highest when the test was proven to be reliable and valid. For example,
one scientist emphasized that the predictive test for male pattern baldness had no
practical use because it could not predict baldness reliably enough to be valid:
They do baldness, but, well they can’t do that reliably, we do baldness but I wouldn’t
want to use those predictions or communicate those predictions in any way because
they are not particularly useful (interviewee 20)
For those working at the coalface, expected utility in case work was the starting
point. It included the ability to progress with crime scene work even if the infor-
mation obtained from these tests had uncertain predictive value. These different
takes on utility reﬂect different underlying professional views about what is
“ethical” – for scientists, being “ethical” is only using validated and trustworthy
tests; for police ofﬁcers it is using all options available to try and catch a perpetrator.
These views on utility therefore need to be situated in broader discussions about the
ethically responsible implementation of FDP. It should be emphasized here that
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those of our respondents who argued for an expansion of the types of tests to be used
under the FDP label did notmisunderstand or exaggerate the reliability or validity of
early tests. Instead, despite their being fully aware of the low predictive value of the
tests, they still thought that the utility of possibly making a breakthrough in the
investigation outweighed the risk of wasting time and money on wrong leads.
Ethical boundary making
Whilst analytic validity and reliability clearly played an important role in deﬁning
FDP, interviewees commonly drew other boundaries around the phenotypic testing
of traits. Most importantly, this related to whether the testing for a phenotypic trait
was, or was perceived to be one that either (a) raised socially sensitive concerns, or
(b) was associated with ethical issues. Phenotypic inference of traits not falling into
either of these categories was more likely to be considered as FDP. This made FDP
analogous to an “ethical safe space” for phenotypic testing in the criminal justice
system, and this was contrasted with unethical practices that were either unvali-
dated or driven purely by commercial interests, such as the creation of “phantom
images” from DNA. Despite the fact that all interviewees created such ethical
boundaries around the FDP “ethical safe space”, they came to different conclusions
regarding what phenotypic tests to speciﬁcally locate inside and outside of this
“ethical safe space”. We discuss this below, paying particular attention to the
detailed descriptions interviewees provided about their views on both socially sen-
sitive testing, and the ethical issues associated with phenotypic testing. We note any
relationships which emerged between interviewees’ views and their professional
background.
1. Socially sensitive issues: political debates and discrimination around ancestry
A number of interviewees discussed issues related to the political and societal sen-
sitivity of ancestry testing (n = 11). While a very small minority of these intervie-
wees (n = 2) did not perceive this testing as particularly ethically, politically and
socially sensitive: “(especially I don’t worry about the problem of race and geo-
graphical ancestors…” [interviewee 13]), for most interviewees (n = 9) the
reverse was the case (M’Charek, Toom, and Prainsack 2012; Toom 2012). This
was especially apparent for interviewees located in Germany, where the historical
context of the Nazi Regime heightens many people’s sensitivity to risks of genetic
discrimination (Sperling 2004, 2013), and where some political actors have
recently linked the expanded use of DNA-testing in criminal investigation to the
topic of migration in scientiﬁcally and politically problematic ways.8 In the
words of one respondent:
I think this issue will be ancestry because we have in Germany based on our history
some awareness when it comes to what ancestry – because people may think of race,
and race was something that was very propagated in the thirties and forties by the
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Nazi regime. And everybody is very careful not to be compared to that area of time
(interviewee 35)
Indeed, for most of these interviewees, the socially and politically sensitive nature
of ancestry inference, and whether it could increase discrimination based on racial
and ethnic stereotypes, was what differentiated it from other phenotypic traits, such
as those for appearance (“I think ancestry has an extra political dimension which
maybe appearance has in a less strong way” [interviewee 15]). This differentiation
meant that they considered ancestry testing as excluded from FDP’s “ethical safe
space”. It was rather something that needed to be “managed more carefully”
than tests for other traits:
I think ancestry for me would probably be the one that I would see would have more
ethical issues. Because when you start proﬁling individuals I think that has to be care-
fully managed. [In this] current climate of operational crisis, I think everyone is on
heightened alert, and I think that also you have got your historic stuff, black on
black use, crime etc stop and search, so there is always that arena that is quite con-
tentious. So I think that would for me, out of the three, be the one that needs to be
managed more carefully (interviewee 34)
For other interviewees (n = 2), although they also saw testing for ancestry as
sensitive, the relationship between probabilistic ancestry and appearance infer-
ence was inseparable. This was because these two sets of predictions were
seen as tightly linked and complementing each other. For these interviewees,
information about biogeographical ancestry could help to make the prediction
of appearance (e.g. skin tone) more accurate, and vice versa. One interviewee
explained, if appearance inference reveals that an individual is likely to have
blue eyes then it is also likely saying that the individual is of European
descent; and if an individual’s skin color is predicted to be dark, then it also
tells us something about their possible ancestry. Ancestry inference testing
was therefore viewed as something that could be within the remit of FDP if it
serves to improve appearance testing:
Phenotypic traits and the ancestry… the nice thing is they help each other… it’s
something that supports each other in terms of the type of genetic information.
And also if you have information that someone is maybe Saharan African origin
and you ﬁnd he has dark skin well that obviously ﬁts together… you can’t handle
these traits separately (interviewee 28)
2. Ethically problematic traits: observable versus “personal” and sensitive
characteristics
Echoing some of the literature, interviewees explained that FDP does not and
should not include phenotypic tests for purely “internal” characteristics (e.g.
those related to predispositions to disease, as well as other sensitive, personal infor-
mation). Rather, FDP should only include the predictive testing of those phenotypic
12 G. Samuel and B. Prainsack
characteristics which are deemed part of a person’s appearance, for example, the
EVCs of skin, hair and eye color – those which are the focus of the VISAGE
project. Such traits were viewed as “not so problematic from the ethical point of
view”:
I think the so-called appearance phenotype, so the ones which you can see if you are an
eye witness, for example eye colour or hair colour so I think they are not so proble-
matic from the ethical point of view because everyone can see them (interviewee 8)
This ethical boundary between EVCs and internal phenotypic traits as they relate to
FDP is in fact echoed in explicit FDP regulation in some countries, including the
Netherlands and Slovakia (Samuel and Prainsack 2018). It was also evident in a
recent court case in France, which ruled that FDP for “morphological character-
istics” (interpreted as those characteristics which can be seen at the outside of
the body)9 was permitted, but predictive phenotyping for internal or private charac-
teristics was not:
Basically what they say is if it’s a [unknown DNA] trace then you can do phenotyping
if it’s a criminal investigation. And what they say in the court decision is that you are
allowed to predict any external physical appearance traits. So nothing internal,
nothing private, but everything that could be seen on a photograph then technically
you should be able to provide it… . (interviewee 33)
Some interviewees’ narratives suggested a gray area between observable character-
istics and internal, personal and health traits. This gray area came in a number of
forms, of which we note three: considerations of age inference, personally sensitive
traits, and the blurriness of health predispositions. We brieﬂy discuss each of these
in turn below to give more of a sense of what the gray area entails.
Considerations of age inference. Interviewees had different views regarding
whether DNA-based (e.g. epigenetic) testing for age inference could reveal sen-
sitive information. For nearly all interviewees who discussed this in detail (n =
11/14), this type of testing was so unlikely to reveal sensitive information that
it was viewed as ethically unproblematic (“age I would consider the least proble-
matic in terms of social impact… I don’t see a real [potential for the] misuse of
the data” (interviewee 27)). Interviewees explained that this was because age rep-
resented a descriptor of what can be seen by looking at a person. Indeed, one of
our interviewees explicitly said that s/he considered age an EVC:
There are the rare examples where some people look way older or way younger than
they are. But most of the people when it comes to such broad age estimation in terms
of age categories it is visible. So for me on that broad level age is a visible trait (inter-
viewee 36)
A minority of our interviewees, all STEM scientists (n = 3) held a different view. In
particular, one of these interviewees perceived age prediction as especially sensi-
tive because of its potential to also disclose information on disease
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predispositions/status, for example with relation to cancer or other medical pro-
blems. For this interviewee, age prediction tests represented a different category
of tests from those commonly subsumed under the FDP label:
We understand forensic DNA phenotyping… [as the]… prediction of appearance
traits, but there are two additional aspects… the ﬁrst is biogeographic ancestry and
the second one is, of course, prediction of age… I’m not sure that [the] forensic
DNA phenotyping term covers all these three aspects – at least I’m hesitating about
age prediction because it’s something completely different. Age prediction can… give
some information about mortality… so it’s… very sensitive [and] it’s a little bit different
to FDP and what we mean by FDP… […]… From the biological age we can directly
know… the medical state [of the individual]. For example, let’s say [a person is] 40
years old, and this is his or her chronological age, but after analysis we know that the bio-
logical age is 50 years old… [This]. means that there is something wrong with his or her
…medical status… – this can be an indication of cancer, for example, or other medical
problems. So it can potentially be very sensitive (interviewee 30)
Sensitive personal traits. Interviewees had different views regarding the inti-
mately personal nature of ancestry, as well as some EVC inference ﬁndings.
These views seemed independent of their professional background, though no
police ofﬁcer interviewees viewed ancestry testing or EVC testing as personal or
sensitive.
In terms of the personal nature of some EVC inference ﬁndings, one particular
interviewee highlighted a scenario with relation to early onset baldness inference
testing. This interviewee explained that whilst “baldness” may be viewed as an
EVC by some interviewees, this may not be the case if a person chooses to hide
their baldness by wearing a hairpiece. For this interviewee, this raised questions
about where to locate an early onset baldness inference test – within or outside
of the remit of the ethical safe space of FDP. As this interviewee remarked,
“[some] visible traits can be sensitive – like baldness… – some individuals may
be really cautious about disclosing that they are bald” (interviewee 30).
An analogous scenario emerged in terms of ancestry inference. Some intervie-
wees believed that “ancestry testing of course can discover personal data which
are more sensitive in my point of view than physical traits” (interviewee 14). As
one interviewee explained:
Ancestry [testing] is not appearance phenotyping but it’s something else… perhaps
you do not want your ancestry to be disclosed. So this also has to be handled more
sensitively than for example, appearance phenotypes. So yes, I think it would be a
good idea also to differentiate between these different types of phenotyping (inter-
viewee 8)
In contrast, other interviewees viewed information about a person’s ancestry as less
about revealing personal (internal) information and more in line with a person’s
EVCs:
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If you are doing your ancestry statement on a continental region [as with VISAGE]
then if a person is of pure continental ancestry and that means both the paternal and
maternal ancestors come from that region, then the person will have appearance traits
that are typical for those type of continental regions. And then you could argue ances-
try is visible in the same way as appearance is… […]…Of course there are couples
of different continental ancestry which have offspring but most people are still of
uniform continental ancestry… indeed you can have cases…where the ancestry is
non visible… [and] the individual doesn’t know… [and] may not want to know
… [and]… also doesn’t want others to know. And then you would be with this
typical application of right not to know privacy example. But… [this]… applies to
a minority of the population (interviewee 36)
The blurriness of health predispositions. Nearly all interviewees emphasised that
any information relating to an individual’s health/a medical predisposition was
intrinsically sensitive personal information, and testing for such traits should not
be permitted within the remit of FDP.
Of course what is very sensitive is disease related… th[ose] areas we are not going,
that’s not allowed, and I think that’s a very good thing (interviewee 29)
At the same time, a few of our interviewees (n = 5) discussed how in the process of
phenotypic testing, information could be produced about an individual’s health/a
medical predisposition as an “incidental ﬁnding” (Haga 2006; Scudder et al.
2018). This would be true if the marker for the tested trait is in close proximity
to a marker for a speciﬁc health pre-disposition.10 This is because portions of
DNA in close proximity are often genetically linked, that is, inherited together
and so the presence of a variant of one marker can be predictive of another. In
the extract below, an interviewee explains these blurred boundaries, having
arisen during the development of DNA-based tests for red hair, and the difﬁcult
questions which remain for the criminal justice ﬁeld in terms of “how far you
can go” when using such tests in a criminal case:
I think the whole notion about pigmentation comes from the medical domain because
… red hair… to a degree was an indicator of certain medical conditions. And that
really needs to be considered and recognised that if you have certain visible traits,
you have to set a limit there as to how far you might be able to go in further inves-
tigating (interviewee 19)
This interviewee concluded: “I wouldn’t necessarily agree with enabling
someone to do a test for clinically relevant traits” (interviewee 19). However,
not all interviewees held this view, and here differences emerged between the
views of (some) police ofﬁcers and other interviewees. One police ofﬁcer
stated that whilst we do need to think these issues through, we should not dis-
count the beneﬁts of also including those traits within FDP that may provide
some clinically relevant information. For this interviewee, and most other
police ofﬁcers, it is important to weigh the value of ﬁnding a suspected
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perpetrator of a serious crime against identifying some personal information
about that individual:
If these markers are powerful and really help to lead the investigation to be accurate is
it not worth it?…We need to decide what to do, do we need to be as accurate as poss-
ible or do we need to not go at all in the medical part of the prediction? And even if
the marker is really slightly attributed to pathology does it really mean something on
the future of the health of the guy you’re trying to predict? I don’t really have an
answer but it’s just a question of what you gain versus what you ethically allow (inter-
viewee 33)
In this way, whilst all interviewees deﬁned FDP as including only those predictive
tests for phenotypic traits which do not primarily aim at providing information
about personal, internal and/or health characteristics, the boundaries of this
ethical safe space were diffuse in terms of the classiﬁcation of traits that could
potentially also disclose health- and disease-relevant information without aiming
to do so. Preliminary evidence suggests that some of these boundaries are related
to professional backgrounds.
Conclusion
We have shown that understandings of what FDP is, and what tests and practices
should be subsumed under its remit, is heterogeneous and complex among prac-
titioners and experts in the ﬁeld. In particular, we have shown how whilst intervie-
wees created boundaries between those phenotypic tests relating to age, ancestry
and appearance that were perceived to be/not to be under the remit of FDP in
terms of reliability and validity, and ethical and social issues/sensitivity, intervie-
wees had different views on where to draw these boundaries (we note that the
remit of FDP could be ﬂuid and subject to change and interference).
Many previous studies have noted how forensic scientists have closed discus-
sions about forensic DNA testing by solely relating them to the importance of
reliability and validity. For our interviewees, a test for a speciﬁc phenotypic trait
had to meet two criteria – be valid and reliable, and ethically unproblematic– to
be contained in an “ethical safe space”; traits sitting outside the safe space were dis-
tanced from FDP. Around this ethical safe space was a gray area containing tests
using markers that could, albeit aimed at testing for traits that were not considered
“private”, inadvertently also disclose disease-relevant or personally sensitive infor-
mation. Different interviewees had different views regarding which of these tests
could be encapsulated within the ethical safe space – in particular, police ofﬁcer
interviewees had broader notions of this, and we discuss this in more detail below.
The fact that our FDP experts consider it important to only use tests which are
deemed ethically “safe” resonates with studies on practices of scientists and prac-
titioners in other areas. Scientiﬁc researchers in other ﬁelds have also used ethical
boundaries to distinguish between “settled”, “no-ethics”, “positive ethical space”
practice and more contested practice (Frith, Jacoby, and Gabbay 2011;
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Wainwright et al. 2006).11 Wainwright argues that researchers distance them-
selves from the latter in order to maintain the image of science, and to give scien-
tiﬁc researchers permission to continue their work (Wainwright et al. 2006).
Perhaps this is what is happening here as our interviewees deﬁned and defended
an ethical boundary in their practices. Though our ﬁndings suggest that some-
thing else is occurring too. It was not just our scientist interviewees who drew
ethical boundaries, but also other practitioners and experts in the ﬁeld of FDP.
And whilst ethical boundaries were used to justify the ethical permissibility of
the technology and separate FDP from a contested space, the boundary-making
worked the other way too: interviewees concerned about phenotypic testing
used FDP as a way to distance those tests they deemed ethically problematic/
socially sensitive away from scientists’ “grasp”. Further research is now war-
ranted to determine how these different modes of boundary making are emerging
in the “adoption space” of FDP (Wienroth 2018); how different expectations are
attached to these boundaries; and how these expectations play a role in develop-
ing communities of FDP practice (see Wienroth 2018).
On the basis of our ﬁndings, we note two main ways in which these can inform
responsible regulation strategies. First, our ﬁndings corroborate the importance of
the “reliability” and “validity” boundary, which has been discussed in the literature
(Murphy 2013; Smith and Urbas 2012). This gives empirical strength to the need to
incorporate this as a key underpinning of any governance oversight system for FDP.
A regulatory framework which only permits those tests which are validated and
reliable protects itself from instances in which there may be a “push” from the crim-
inal justice system, possibly via (as some of our interviewees explained to us) the
public and/or mass media, as they attempt to solve a serious, possibly highly
emotive, horriﬁc crime. This is important since our ﬁndings suggest at least
some evidence that (some) police are more likely to wish to conduct less reliable
or less valid tests in exchange for a perceived increased utility in terms of appre-
hending a perpetrator. For these police ofﬁcers being ethically responsible is
related to using all technologies available in the hope of identifying a lead. In
these instances, we can imagine a scenario in which a person has murdered a
number of people. Police ofﬁcers, understandably, want as much help as possible
when trying to identify the perpetrator (for example, in the form of information
about what the perpetrator looks like), especially if they have no other leads.
However, we argue that un-validated and/or unreliable tests may offer little in
the way of actual (rather than perceived) utility in police ofﬁcers’ attempts to appre-
hend the suspected perpetrator; and possibly have the potential to provide false
leads. In these instances, we would argue it is more ethically responsible to put
more effort into those technologies and approaches with a better chance of yielding
promising results for the police. We do not view the technology as capable of
“ﬁnding answers” before it is has been sufﬁciently and responsibly developed to
do so.
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Having said all of this, questions still remain about what constitutes a “valid” and
“reliable” phenotypic test, and what threshold of probabilistic accuracy must be
reached to classify a test as FDP. Our ﬁndings indicate differences in views
about this, at least some of which can be attributed to professional background,
with police ofﬁcers more willing to accept lower standards of reliability and val-
idity in exchange for an increased perceived utility. Due to the nature of the
tests, FDP will never predict traits with certainty, and we still need to explore
where to draw the line with respect to these different professional views, and
whether this should depend on the type of crime being investigated. Our further
work continues to explore this.
Second, whilst the heterogeneity of our interviewees’ opinions about which phe-
notypic inference tests should or should not be considered under the remit of FDP
makes it difﬁcult to prescribe recommendations about a responsible regulatory fra-
mework with relation to this, our ﬁndings are instructive in that they highlight that
attempts to draw boundaries around which FDP tests are permitted in terms of ethi-
cally disputed and non-disputed tests lack nuance (see also Seo et al. 2017). This is
not only because all tests, to a certain degree, can be perceived as ethically proble-
matic, but also because, as we have shown, stakeholders prioritize different ethical
issues as more or less valuable, and moreover, (some) different professional stake-
holders have different views on the ethical utility of such tests. Such different
understandings of what tests are deemed ethically problematic and/or valuable,
whilst socially constructed and related to each individual’s or profession’s own
identity, still need consideration. Indeed, the heterogeneity of views highlighted
in our ﬁndings, which resonates with ﬁndings from the ethical boundary literature
previously (Hobson-West 2012; Wainwright et al. 2006), illustrate the pluralistic
and contested nature of ethical values “on the ground” between different individ-
uals and different professional stakeholders in the criminal justice system.
Similar ﬁndings have been described in other areas of science where different pro-
fessional or individual stakeholders adopt different ethical “role positions” (Cribb
et al. 2008; Samuel et al. 2016), and ﬁndings by Williams and Johnson (2004)
show how various actors in the criminal justice system represent forensic DNA
technologies differently. This raises questions about how best to weigh up such
role positions/representations given their social, cultural and political contexts.
We argue that all positions are important and need to be considered as having
merit within their socio-cultural context. Our ﬁndings therefore provide important
empirical evidence for policymakers as they develop frameworks for FDP. It
reminds them to consider and incorporate this pluralism, and to carefully balance
the nuances of the different values of interviewees (and professions) against each
other, whilst at the same time concomitantly taking into account their different
social contexts. This is the approach we took (i.e. considering ethical pluralism
as well as considering different social context) when developing our recommen-
dations to only consider valid and reliable tests under FDP even though our
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interviewees varied in their beliefs about this (though we note that we are conduct-
ing further research to deﬁne how “valid” and “reliable” the tests need to be).
Finally, whilst, we conceptualized our ﬁndings within ethical boundary making,
instead of using concepts of “social relationships”, “rhetoric” or “discourses of
power” (Kruse 2015; Vailly 2017; Williams and Johnson 2004) – the latter of
which would have paid more attention to the social, political and cultural context
of different discourses which have led to the emergence of FDP (Jong and
M’charek 2017; Vailly 2017; Wienroth 2018) – we remind policymakers to
remain vigilant of distributions, practices and institutions of power in their respect-
ive societies when making decisions about where to draw regulatory boundaries.
What is required is a more considered approach with relation to this.
To ﬁnish, any responsible research and innovation program must engage both
professional and public stakeholder views with regards to future policy decisions.
We believe that our ﬁndings offer a useful base to now explore expert, stakeholder,
and potentially also public views on FDP in more detail i.e. now that we empirically
understand the nature of the different boundaries our interviewees created around
phenotypic testing in the criminal justice system; as well as the questions remaining
regarding how to deﬁne such boundaries (for example in terms of “reliable” and
“valid”), we can use these ﬁndings to frame our discussions with the public and
civil society. In essence, interpreting our ﬁndings in terms of ethical boundary
making gives us the conceptual tool for this further research. Combining this
further research with the ﬁndings reported in this paper will then allow us to
move forwards more concretely towards proposing responsible recommendations
for the regulation of FDP for age, ancestry and appearance.
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Notes
1. Epigenetic testing is based on the analysis of DNA methylation patterns.
2. For an in-depth discussion of the complexity of these frameworks and practices in EU countries,
and any on-going policy discussions, see Samuel and Prainsack (2018).
3. http://www.visage-h2020.eu/.
4. http://www.visage-h2020.eu/.
5. The eight countries were chosen because they are represented in the VISAGE consortium.
6. See (Vailly 2017; Williams and Johnson 2004) for examples of other conceptualizations
describing different views associated with forensic DNA technologies (e.g. “different
representations”; “different rhetorical (power) discourses”). See (Jong and M’charek 2017;
Vailly 2017; Wienroth 2018) for a deeper discussion the social, political and cultural context
of different discourses which have led to the emergence of FDP. See (Kruse 2015) for a
deeper discussion on the social context of the use of forensic evidence.
7. This is in spite of continuing concerns about ethical issues – in particular, related to privacy and
undue discrimination – which continue to exist; and also despite of an awareness that the non-
coding/coding DNA boundary is blurry, with instances existing of speciﬁc “non-coding”
genetic markers being used to predict information about phenotypic traits (Kayser 2015).
There are two reasons why this could be the case. First, the marker is within an area of the
coding region’s regulatory function (typically deﬁned as non-coding). Second, because the
marker and the respective coding region are in close proximity. Portions of DNA in close
proximity are often genetically linked, that is, inherited together, and so the presence of a
speciﬁc STR variant (haplotype) can be predictive of a speciﬁc observable trait (because
speciﬁc sequence of DNA are inherited together). Indeed, a number of non-coding STR
haplotype markers are used to predict EVCs.
8. https://www.nature.com/news/forensics-germany-considers-wider-use-of-dna-evidence-in-
criminal-cases-1.21713.
9. The Court case was ruling on the permissibility of using FDP in a serial rapist case in Lyon. The
investigating Magistrate had requested FDP testing for hair, eye and skin color not knowing that
it was forbidden to perform such tests in France. When he tried to erase the order the status of the
legality of the test was examined.
10. This is different for age markers. Here, the methylation pattern of DNAwhich gives information
about the biological age of a person, can also be indicative for a disease-related status.
11. Limitations of using the ethical-boundary work perspective exist, including the notion that by
referring to a safe space as “ethical” we are also taking part in categorizing – in this case
with relation to what we as authors deem ethical and socially sensitive (Hobson-West 2012).
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